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Although not a Victorian term the word ‘interdiscipline’ has existed since 1930, when 
it was used in the eighteenth annual report of the Social Science Research Council: ‘Concern 
with “co-operative research” or “inter-discipline problems” should not be allowed to hamper 
the first-rate mind, alert to the possibilities inherent in whatever problem enlists its energies.’1  
Subsequent usage continues to reflect this definition, not least in periodical titles ranging 
across an array of topics.2  This chapter traces the idea of an interdiscipline to Walter Pater’s 
famous adage ‘All art constantly aspires to the condition of music’3 and it uses Pater’s idea to 
identify the origin of Victorian musicology not as a discipline, but as an interdiscipline.  
Pater, like many Victorian musicologists, makes his claim by using two interrelated, 
interdisciplinary concepts: ekphrasis and anderstreben.  Broadly speaking, ekphrasis is a 
method of writing designed to embody literally the essential characteristics of another art; 
anderstreben explains how the arts seek one another as they progress towards perfection. 
Pater uses ekphrasis to describe a painting representing a concert, and in doing so reveals 
how literature seeks to embody painting in the same way painting seeks to embody music.  
According to the rules of anderstreben all art aspires to the condition of music because music 
is the only art that successfully collapses matter and form.  In the construction of their 
interdiscipline Victorian musicologists, like Pater, would adopt ekphrasis as a methodological 
practice and anderstreben as a theoretical belief.  Pater’s structural preoccupation with matter 
and form provides a strong organizational framework for interrogating key issues 
underpinning the interdiscipline of Victorian musicology.  An introduction explores the 
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meaning of ‘interdiscipline’ today, followed by two main sections: under the section titled 
‘Matter’ are two subsections on practice investigating the close symbiotic relationship 
between the Victorian musical object and the Victorian musicological subject; under ‘Form’ 
two subsections on theory illustrate how Pater’s seemingly oppositional methodologies of 
ekphrasis and anderstreben combine to create the dynamic interdiscipline of Victorian 
musicology.  A conclusion reiterates my thesis, summarizes main points and overarching 
principles, discusses limitations and offers a projection towards further areas of research. 
 
Interdisciplin(arity) 
Good definitions of ‘interdiscipline’ are elusive.  Wikipedia and the OED give the impression 
that they stem largely from interrelated sciences like biosemantics, forensic kinesiology, 
genetic toxicology, humor and translation, information science, public health, social science 
in agriculture and sociolinguistics.  According to J. Stycos demography, for example, is 
‘clearly a discipline’ because as a field it contains ‘its own body of interrelated concepts, 
techniques, journals, and professional associations . . . But by the nature of its subject matter 
and methods demography is just as clearly an ‘interdiscipline’, drawing heavily on biology 
and sociology for the study of fertility; on economics and geography for studies of migration; 
and on the health sciences for the study of mortality.’4  Historically, definitions have tended 
to reflect a hard scientific or social scientific origin, even if they are widely applicable across 
the arts as well.  Human communications theorist S. W. Littlejohn defines an interdiscipline 
as ‘a field of scholars who identify with various disciplines but share a common interest in a 
theme that crosses traditional boundaries.’5  Echoing Littlejohn humanities computing expert 
Willard McCarty claims that ‘A true interdiscipline is, however, not easily understood, 
funded or managed in a world already divided along disciplinary lines, despite the standard 
pieties.  Properly so called an interdiscipline is not just another administrative entity with its 
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budget, chair and department members – difficult as this is to carve these days out of existing 
turf; it isn’t an institutionally sa[n]ctioned (sic) kind of poaching.  Rather it is an entity that 
exists in the interstices of the existing fields, dealing with some, many or all of them.’6  An 
interdiscipline is ‘constituted precisely by that unifying perspective on what happens at the 
intersection of two or more fields. This perspective gives the interdiscipline integrity and 
basis for its own research agenda, curriculum and publications.  Nevertheless, as long as it 
remains an interdiscipline it depends on continuous activity in the intersecting fields.  
Preoccupation with what they share puts it in position to foster cross-fertilising exchange 
among them, as a merchant trader among mutually incomprehending cultures.   Thus it serves 
them, not as a servant his master but collegially – which has radical implications for its 
institutionalisation.’7 
 More recent theorists struggle to develop these definitions, emphasizing the 
fundamentally binaristic nature of disciplinary and interdisciplinary projects rather than the 
collective unity of an interdiscipline.  Theorists today tend to focus on the constantly 
changing dynamics of disciplinary configuration, admitting that they produce inevitably 
‘fuzzy’ interdisciplinary boundaries.8  For them the very production of new research militates 
against disciplinary stability because disciplines are congenitally driven to change themselves 
from within.  The notion that disciplines are inherently fluid is confirmed and explored in this 
volume in the fields of science (chapter 1), mathematics (chapter 10), and history (chapter 5).  
Jerry Jacobs recognizes this condition as ‘a form of social organization that generates new 
ideas and research findings, certifies this knowledge, and in turn teaches this subject matter to 
interested students.’9  Predictably, the self-negating or self-fulfilling cycle of disciplinary 
configuration produces taxonomic implications.  Julie Klein identifies a host of socio-
institutional forces pressurizing disciplinary stability, including multidisciplinarity, 
interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity.  These range across a spectrum of methodologies 
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from disciplinarity to interdisciplinarity; complementarity to hybridization; partial to full 
integrationism;10 and even something as potentially extreme and intractable as ‘deviant 
interdisciplinarity’11 – an interdiscipline yearning for lost disciplinary unity.  It must have 
been these same forces which pressured editors of the tantalizingly (yet in reality only 
modestly) subversive In(ter)discipline: New Languages for Criticism (2007) to bracket 
interdiscipline into indiscipline in the title of their otherwise profoundly interdisciplinary 
proceedings.12  For Peter Szendy an interdiscipline ‘has the disadvantage of presupposing the 
boundaries of the very disciplines it seeks to question.’13  For today’s ethnomusicologists, for 
example – long used to working across musicology and anthropology – an interdiscipline is 
porous; it is ‘a discipline itself that has its roots in two older disciplines . . . rather than an 
interdisciplinary field.’14  Wolfgang Krohn makes a not dissimilar point when he refers to 
interdisciplines as ‘disciplines with interdisciplinary features.’15  Like Joe Moran – who as it 
so happens omits ‘interdiscipline’ from Interdisciplinarity (2010) – Krohn encapsulates the 
fuzziness and conceptual recalcitrance of the term.  As William McCarty says, not only does 
an interdiscipline defy definition but in the way it behaves interdisciplines are almost 
indistinguishable from disciplines themselves: ‘an interdiscipline manoeuvres for power in 
the same way as a discipline.  But rather than as a discipline, which seems to delimit and 
maintain its conceptual boundaries, an interdiscipline embraces other areas of thought.  A 
discipline defends – an interdiscipline bridges.’16   
 
Matter 
The musical object 
We tend to think of the Victorians as great bridge-builders, architecturally and conceptually, 
but the origin of disciplines tells another story.  Far from building bridges, many disciplines 
appear to burn their bridges in the unrelenting quest for specialization.  Not the interdiscipline 
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of musicology.  Musicology built bridges spanning every conceivable discipline, including a 
wide array of increasingly professionalized disciplines in the arts and sciences such as 
zoology, anthropology, ethnology, pedagogy, biography, history, philosophy and theology, to 
name but a few.  Victorian musicology owes its interdisciplinarity partly to the fact that no 
single discipline can speak definitively about an object; equally, Victorian musicology found 
its object particularly troublesome.  For one thing Victorian musicologists struggled to 
understand and explain music’s purpose without reference to other disciplines, and in some 
instances disciplines like anthropology and theology seemed to hold mutually contradictory 
opinions, even if voiced through the same musicologist. 
Modern ethnomusicologist Chris Small famously contends that music’s purpose is 
entirely social: ‘There is no such thing as music.  Music is not a thing at all, but an activity, 
something that people do.  The apparent thing “music” is a figment, an abstraction of the 
action, whose reality vanishes as soon as we examine it at all closely.’17  Small’s 
contemporary Richard Blacking utilizes a similar anthropological approach: music, he claims, 
is ‘humanly organized sound.’18  In fact, Small and Blacking update a common Victorian 
trope first voiced by public intellectual, Victorian polemicist and musical theorist Herbert 
Spencer in 1857.  Influenced by comprehensive reading across disciplines in the sciences and 
social sciences Spencer considered music to be intrinsically social because it arose from 
language as ‘impassioned speech’: ‘The distinctive traits of song’, he claims, ‘are simply the 
traits of emotional speech intensified and systematized . . . all music, is an idealization of the 
natural language of passion.’19  Spencer also believed that the emotional experience which 
prompts music into being also prompts an altruistic socio-evolutionary characteristic: 
sympathy.  For Spencer musical feelings are ‘the chief media of sympathy’: ‘In its bearings 
upon human happiness, this emotional language which musical culture develops and refines 
is only second in importance to the language of the intellect; perhaps not even second to it.  
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For these modifications of voice produced by feelings are the means of exciting like feelings 
in others.  Joined with gestures and expressions of face, they give life to the otherwise dead 
words in which the intellect utters its ideas, and so enable the hearer not only to understand 
the state of mind they accompany, but to partake of that state.  In short they are the chief 
media of sympathy.’20  Described by George S. Carr as ‘the very apostle of Altruism’21 
Spencer reflects an increasingly long line of liberal social thinkers when he equates the 
musical object with musical emotion, musical emotion with sympathy, and sympathy with 
social progress.  According to nineteenth-century philosopher and religious thinker John 
Fiske social progress ‘is the continuous weakening of selfishness and the continuous 
strengthening of sympathy.  Or—to use a more convenient and somewhat more accurate 
expression suggested by Comte—it is a gradual supplanting of egoism by altruism.’22  For 
Spencer all altruistic feelings may be a mixture of enlightened self-interest and social 
sympathy23 – ‘sympathetic excitements of egoistic feelings’,24 he calls them – but music is 
chief amongst them because the musical object is intrinsically connected to the musical 
subject in the mutually contingent relationship of ‘musicking’.  In other words, music is only 
music because it is felt; it is only felt if it is musicked (to use Small’s term); and it only 
musicked because it embodies favourable socio-evolutionary characteristics (sympathy and 
altruism).  Even sympathy and altruism are selfish memes,25 however, and according to 
Spencer music is chief amongst them; at least this is what many scientifically-minded 
Victorians seemed to believe about the purpose of music.26 
Yet Spencer’s evolutionary anthropology is not entirely consistent from a purely 
disciplinary standpoint.  Obsessed with the relation of unity and diversity from the 1860s 
Spencer embarked upon an embarrassingly retrograde transcendental odyssey eventually 
reprised in ‘Religion: A Retrospect and Prospect’ (1884) which would describe the ‘an 
Infinite and Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed’.27  Spencer attracted huge critical 
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opprobrium when he dallied (unsuccessfully) with the idea of a transcendental Absolute – 
what he described as the Unknown Reality – because for some it compromised the integrity 
of his unremittingly materialistic philosophical project: ‘Though Spirit and Matter [are 
antithetical conceptions] . . . the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of 
the Unknown Reality which underlies both.’28 The Rev George Ladd tried to help but 
probably made matters worse by suggesting the Unknowable was effectively God in 
everything but name: ‘the Unknowable is known to be a Power; and it must be a great Power, 
for the Universe – that is, all manifestations of power – is manifest to us.  But power, 
inconceivably great – enough to accomplish all things done and even more – has been by 
Theists from time immemorial held to be an attribute of God.  But Mr Spencer speaks of the 
Power; and as he nowhere uses the plural and doubtless holds to the unity of the Universe, 
having himself made and attempt to represent in philosophy this unity of the universe, he 
must believe in the unity also of the Power which the one universe manifests.’29  Spencer 
believed in the relativity all things – music included.  Everything is interconnected by the 
unifying force of evolution, even thought itself: ‘every thought expresses a relation – since 
thinking is relational’; ‘every thought involves a whole system of thoughts and ceases to exist 
if severed from its various correlatives.’30  With the admission of an Absolute Unknowable 
the idea that music was the idealized language of the emotions took on an undeniably 
transcendental hue.  Suddenly musical sympathy began to look more and more theological 
and less and less anthropological.  Even arch-agnostic Darwin failed to help.  Writing about 
music’s function as part of the rituals of sexual selection amongst birds Darwin claims that 
music conjures up a range of emotions of a long past age, the most importance of which is the 
most spiritually essentialized – love: ‘Love’, Darwin claims, ‘is still the commonest themes 
of our own songs.’31 
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Spencer’s disciplinary confusion over music’s purpose mirrors contemporary 
philosophical confusion over the meaning of form and content in music.  Is music ‘absolute’ 
and transcendental; or is it ‘programmatic’ and culturally contingent?  Should content map 
onto pre-determined form like sonata or rondo; or should form structurally mirror the literary 
narrative (the programme) its content seeks to represent?  Not unconnectedly, does the use of 
words diminish or increase the purity of compositional meaning?  Yet again the musical 
object was a site of intense disciplinary contingency.  If neither anthropology nor theology 
could explain its purpose maybe philosophy could, at the very least, explain its meaning.  
Easier said than done, as philosopher Roger Scruton proves: music, he avers, ‘does not 
merely echo or imitate things which have an independent reality; the development of 
programme music is determined by the development of its theme.  The music moves in time 
according to the logic of its subject and not [like absolute music] according to autonomous 
principles of its own.’32  The fierceness of debate is captured in the diametrically opposing 
disciplinary perspectives of absolutist Eduard Hanslick and programmaticist Franz Liszt.  
Drawing upon metaphysical philosophies of German Idealism Hanslick considered the term 
music to exclude not only compositions with words, but even instrumental compositions with 
programmatic inscriptions: music’s ‘union with poetry,’ he opines, ‘though enhancing the 
power of music, does not widen its limits.’33  For Liszt, however, the most meaningful music 
is theological, and the most theological music is programmatic because art, like music, should 
reflect life in the way life reflects its divine Creator, even music which includes no literary 
programme at all: 34 ‘In program music,’ he advises, ‘the recurrence, variation, alteration, and 
modulation of motifs are determined by their relationship to a poetic idea.  Here one theme 
no longer begets another . . . Though not ignored, all exclusively musical considerations are 
subordinated to the treatment of the subject at hand.  Accordingly, the treatment and subject 
of this symphonic genre demand an engagement that goes beyond the technical treatment of 
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the musical material.  The vague impressions of the soul are elevated to definite impressions 
through an articulated plan, which is taken in by the ear in much the same manner in which a 
cycle of paintings is taken in by the eye.  The artist who favors this kind of artwork enjoys the 
advantage of being able to connect  with a poetic process all those affects which an orchestra 
can express with such great power.’35 
 
The musicological subject 
Whether absolutist or programmaticist, Victorian musicologists made theology, 
anthropology, philosophy and many other disciplines unwitting partners in the construction of 
their interdiscipline.  They did that by defining themselves as much as they defined the 
musical object they studied.  The Victorian musicological subject (the musicologist) defined 
himself or herself within a matrix of three intersecting areas of socio-cultural development: 
professionalization, education and popularization.  If the founding of a professional 
organization signals the origin of a discipline, then Victorian musicology began in 1874 with 
the founding of the Musical (later Royal) Association.  Unsurprisingly perhaps the Musical 
Association’s manifesto is consummately interdisciplinary; according to one of its first Vice 
Presidents William Spottiswoode ‘It has been suggested by several leading persons interested 
both in the theory and practice of Music, that the formation of a Society, similar in the main 
features of its organisation to existing Learned Societies, would be a great public benefit.  
Such a Musical Society might comprise among its members the foremost Musicians, 
theoretical as well as practical, of the day; the principal Patrons of Art; and also those 
Scientific men whose researches have been directed to the science of Acoustics, and to 
kindred inquiries.  Its periodical meetings might be devoted partly to the reading of Papers 
upon the history, the principles, and the criticism of Music; partly to the illustration of such 
Papers by actual performance; and partly to the exhibition and discussion of experiments 
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relating to the theory and construction of musical instruments, or to the principles and 
combination of musical sounds.’36  Spottiswoode expresses a categorical interdisciplinary 
criterion when he emphasizes the need for parity between theory and practice, and models the 
association and its patronage upon similar professional societies.  He also embraces 
experimental science (especially acoustics) at the same time as developing intradisciplinary 
methodologies in music history, criticism, analysis and technology (organology).  If an 
interdiscipline ‘exists in the interstices of the existing fields’37 and is a ‘field of scholars who 
identify with various disciplines but share a common interest in a theme that crosses 
traditional boundaries’38 – if ‘a discipline defends and an interdiscipline bridges’39 – 
Spottiswoode’s interdisciplinary Victorian musicologist would be a wholehearted advocate.  
Indeed, Spottiswoode came with excellent interdisciplinary credentials.  Amongst them he 
was a fellow of the Society of Antiquaries; treasurer of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science (1861-74); president of the Ethnological Society of London from 
1864; treasurer of the Royal Institution (1865-73); in 1865 president of the mathematical 
section, and in 1878 president of the British Association; president of the London 
Mathematical Society (1870-72); and from 1853 fellow, from 1871 to 1878 treasurer, and in 
1878 president of the Royal Society.  In addition, he was a fully paid up member and later 
president in 1878 of the influential dining club for scientific naturalists the X-Club.40 
In referring to the association’s educational remit Spottiswoode also highlights the 
epistemic tension between discipline and interdiscipline by creating ‘a form of social 
organization that generates new ideas and research findings, certifies this knowledge, and in 
turn teaches this subject matter to interested students.’41  In fact the Musical Association 
effectively joined an educational programme already underway in universities like 
Edinburgh, Cambridge, Oxford, and London.  Here, as in the cases of dance (chapter 2), art 
history (chapter 3), history (chapter 4), theology (chapter 9), and classics (chapter 9), the role 
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of the university could be crucial.  Edinburgh created an undergraduate music curriculum in 
1838.  Cambridge taught acoustics from the 1830s and had developed a music curriculum by 
the 1870s.  Oxford was slower off the mark in teaching acoustics, but along with Trinity 
College of Music (University of London) had caught up with Cambridge by the time they 
inaugurated their own curriculum in the 1870s.  The Rev. Peter Maurice, Chaplain to New 
and All Souls colleges in Oxford, discussed the role disciplines played in this transitional 
process.  In an incendiary letter to Earl Derby, then Chancellor of the university, Maurice 
complains vociferously about music’s inferior status within the university; a lack of cohesion 
between music students and graduates to their colleges and institution; disadvantageous 
distinctions between doctors of music and other disciplines; and the denial of honours 
allowing them the privilege of voting in university elections and sitting in Convocation.42  
The topic of Oxford’s historical DMus (Doctor of Music, always in Composition) degree says 
its all: A Doctor (or Inceptor) in Music must have studied and practices his art for a long time 
of years, though Oxford contributes not a mite towards his qualification, but exacts, without 
taking any steps to ensure the decent performance of those elaborate and finished 
compositions which a Doctor in Music must compose . . . The musical degrees, as far as 
Oxford is concerned, are an empty name, with no privilege whatever attached to them within 
its walls; even a seat among its Doctors in the House of Assembly is denied to the entire 
faculty.  And, if this is the treatment which the representatives of the most liberal of all the 
Arts and Sciences meets with, in the most famous of all the Universities in the world, who 
can feel astonishment at the little respect paid to the faculty elsewhere!’43  Two of Maurice’s 
imperatives signal the origin of a Victorian musicological interdiscipline.  Firstly it is 
absolutely imperative that the university’s self-perpetuating prejudice against music is 
abolished, for only then can we prevent ‘those very talents which nature may have lavished 
upon us’ from being ‘buried, or perhaps rusted away’;44 and secondly, and contingent upon 
12 
 
succeeding in abolishing prejudice, is the need to reformulate the university’s understanding 
of music’s historical position amongst the Arts and Sciences.  This is more than a plea to 
reassert music’s place within the medieval quadrivium but an interdisciplinary imperative to 
reinvigorate lost, lapsed relationships with Classics and Theology in particular: ‘All classical 
literature,’, he opines, ‘from its earliest era, has been invariably identified with Music’; 
‘What’, moreover, ‘has been done for Music ever since its divorcement from Theology?’45 
Maurice’s musicologist may be uncompromising in the interdisciplinary educational 
demands he places upon an unresponsive university – to rise to the highest class Music, he 
claims, must pay ‘diligent and painful attention to all the disciplines of the Art and Science’46 
– but he is equally demanding upon the development of culture more popularly.  
Popularization puts interdisciplinary musicological theory into cultural practice by 
triangulating professionalization and education, and it does so through an array of disciplines 
distributed across the arts and sciences.  Bernard Lightman offers an assessment of scientific 
popularization; for him science ‘became fashionable and respectable within a broader 
spectrum of the populace, not just within the circles of the well to do . . . Scientific 
knowledge seemed to offer the magical password – the “open sesame” – that unlocked the 
doors to exhilarating new works in the second half of the century.’47  But as Lightman and I 
have aimed to prove science is nothing without the Arts;48 indeed, by focusing on the 
interdisciplinary ‘threshold’ between the sciences and the arts (particularly as expressed by 
female popularizers), Lightman highlights the importance their cross-fertilization contributes 
to the creation of knowledgeable Victorian generalists.49  Scientific popularizer Annie Carey 
may as well be speaking for musicology when she claims that ‘Elementary knowledge – 
meaning by that phrase a knowledge of the facts that stand on the threshold of every 
department of Science and Art – needs most especially to be accurately presented and 
carefully instilled in early life.’50  The same interdisciplinary concept of ‘threshold’ appears 
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in Victorian musicology, culminating in the popularizing book The Threshold of Music: An 
Inquiry Into the Development of the Musical Sense (1908) by late Victorian music 
psychologist William Wallace.  In his lugubriousness Wallace reads much like Maurice did 
some sixty years earlier despite all the advances in music over the years, but while Maurice 
represents the origin of an interdisciplinary initiative Wallace is already operating within an 
established – if slowly developing – interdisciplinary threshold: ‘The scientific man is 
somewhat complacent’, he maintains: ‘All scientific men are not musicians, nor are many 
musicians versed in science.’51 
 
Form 
Ekphrasis and the interdisciplinary musical object 
If tested, the same could perhaps be said of literary figures – with one major exception: 
Walter Pater.  Critic and philosopher Walter Pater is not generally interpreted in 
interdisciplinary contexts to my knowledge (he does not appear in The Oxford Handbook of 
Interdisciplinarity, for example) but his work provides a rare opportunity to theorize 
musicological interdisciplinarity from a contemporary Victorian standpoint.  Pater’s reference 
to music is famous as much for its clarity as its opaqueness: ‘All art constantly aspires 
towards the condition of music. For while in all other kinds of art it is possible to distinguish 
the matter from the form, and the understanding can always make this distinction, yet it is the 
constant effort of art to obliterate it. That the mere matter of a poem, for instance, its subject, 
namely, its given incidents or situation –that the mere matter of a picture, the actual 
circumstances of an event, the actual topography of a landscape – should be nothing without 
the form, the spirit, of the handling, that this form, this mode of handling, should become an 
end in itself, should penetrate every part of the matter: this is what all art constantly strives 
after, and achieves in different degrees.’ 52 
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The enigmatic meaning behind Pater’s assertion has eluded scholars for years.  More 
recently, and not unlike many literary historians, musicologist Mark Evan Bonds has tried 
explaining it as an extension of Hanslick’s concept of absolute music.  Having presumably 
read Hanslick’s treatise, Pater, according to Bonds, hoped to apply to art the same kind of 
inseparability of form and content possible only in music:53 ‘It is the art of music’, Pater 
avers, ‘which most completely realizes this artistic ideal, this perfect identification of matter 
and form. In its consummate moments, the end is not distinct from the means, the subject 
from the expression; they inhere in and completely saturate each other; and to it, therefore, to 
the condition of its perfect moments, all the arts may be supposed constantly to aspire.’54  
Two interrelated concepts emerge from Pater’s dalliance with music: ekphrasis and 
anderstreben.  Music philosopher Lydia Goehr defines ekphrasis as producing ‘images for the 
mind’s eye by means of words.’55 Pater comes in a long line of ekphrastic communicators, 
and uses the technique to describe Titian’s Concert (1510–12), praising ‘the skill with which 
he caught the waves of wandering sound, and fixed them forever on the lips and hands’ of the 
performers.’56  But as Goehr claims, Victorian and ancient ekphrasis differ: Victorian 
ekphrasis focused on the comparison of aesthetic objects like music, art and poetry; ancient 
ekphrasis, on the act of conjuring up an image through spoken of written words.57  Goehr 
distinguishes these by referring to ‘aesthetic presence when ekphrasis remains within the 
domain of the arts, and to imaginative presence when it extends beyond this domain.’58  
Aesthetic (modern) and imaginative (ancient) presence are not unlike the disciplines they 
draw upon to conjure up an image; all aesthetic presences aspire to condition of imaginative 
presence. 
 Ekphrasis plays an important role in the way the musical object is imagined and 
constructed by the Victorian interdisciplinary musicological subject.  For Pater although as an 
aesthetic presence the musical object represents the perfect conflation of matter and form 
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(presumably whether absolute or programme) it is paradoxically only through the imaginative 
presence that its properties come to life.  This is roundly proved by Victorian musicology, 
which invests the musical object with inherent social properties, like Spencerian sympathy or 
Darwinian love, while through literary prose communicating those characteristics in ways 
which seek to mirror the very object they wish to study.  Spencer is not renowned for the 
elegance of his prose, but when it comes to music he is unusually ekphrastic.  In addition to 
describing non-vocal expression Spencer peppers ‘The Origin and Function of Music’ with 
short ekphrastic illuminations of spoken text.  The ‘Oh’ of astonishment or delight 
exemplifies the middle voice; ‘Beware!’, the lower voice; ‘Hallo! How came you here?, 
contrasting registers; calling for the maid ‘Mary’, an ascending interval of a third – the list is 
extensive.  Fuller sentences extend this ekphrastic approach, and replicate the emotional 
tempo: ‘The slowest movements, largo and adagio, are used where such depressing emotions 
as grief, or such unexciting emotions as reverence, are to be portrayed; while the more rapid 
movements, andante, allegro, presto, represent successively increasing degrees of mental 
vivacity.’59  Darwin is noticeably similar, if more elegantly poetic, when writing about 
musical origins, as he conjures up the intangible sensations of musical experience in the 
words he uses to describe them: ‘The sensations and ideas excited in us by music, or by the 
cadences of impassioned oratory, appear from their vagueness, yet depth, like mental 
reversions to the emotions and thoughts of a long-past age.’60 
While Darwin’s ekphrastic imagination is well known,61 and Spencer’s has probably 
never attracted attention, the influence of an ekphrastic imagination has never been placed in 
Victorian musicological contexts, even though examples of it are ubiquitous.  It was 1896 
before Victorian ornithological field books, for example, included illustrations of birdsong 
transcribed into musical notation62 – before then field guides used mnemonics in lieu.  But 
mnemonic books like A Dictionary of Bird Notes (1889) take ekphrastic techniques to an 
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altogether higher zoomusicological level, producing a veritable Note-Bird/Bird-Note 
dictionary crammed not simply with mneumonics but ekphrastic glosses on onomatopoeic 
syllables.  Thus, the Great Black-backed Gull produces a ‘croak (harsh)’; the Ring Dove, 
‘coo-coo-co-co-coo (soft)’63 in a way which aspires to the conflation of form and content 
heralded by Pater and Hanslick as absolute music. Earlier still, the same ekphrastic 
imagination occurs in pedagogical writing which for educational purposes tries to replicate 
the actual sound of musical objects, in reverse literary direction to programme music.  ‘The 
Butterfly’ in Henry Keatley Moore’s emphatically Froebelian Child’s Pianoforte Book 
(1880?) makes this explicit: ‘Now you know how the butterfly flutters its wings as it hovers 
over the flowers; and how frequently it rests, with wings quite still . . . Let us try to express 
both the fluttering and the resting in our music.’64  FIGURE 12.1 HERE For Keatley Moore, 
like all Froebelians, there is a tangible – one might say ‘programmaticist’ – relationship 
between concepts and reality and music exemplifies that more than any other art; according 
to Froebel music is ‘representation through sound’, and song ‘life-giving word’. 65 
Keatley Moore was not alone in applying an ekphrastic imagination to an 
interdisciplinary musical object caught between its epistemic reality as music and its 
linguistic representation in words.  Like Keatley Moore, co-educationist John Curwen, 
founder of Britain’s most popular singing method Tonic Sol-Fa, also roots his teaching in an 
ekphrastic language combining all the ingredients of music – amongst them rhythm, tone, 
melody, phrase, timbre, accent and meter: ‘‘Now, children, we are going to learn the art of 
singing in tune.  What are we going to learn?  First, then, you must remember that any 
musical sound is called a note.  What is a musical sound called?  This is a note.’  (I hear you 
singing to the sound ah any note you please.)’66  Heavily influenced by educationist Johann 
Heinrich Pestalozzi (Froebel’s teacher), Curwen like Keatley Moore triangulates visual, 
musical and textual ekphrasis in a kind of imagesoundtext, to expand W. J. T. Mitchell’s 
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concept of imagetext.67  The image of the ‘The Butterfly’ (Figure 12.1), for example, not only 
harmonizes text and tune (Figure 12.2) by encapsulating two states of stillness and movement 
it also captures in perspective and position the rising opening figure of the music. The more 
distant fluttering butterfly is the note G, which nears as it rises up to the note D (the dominant 
to G’s tonic) on the third beat of the first bar where it stops briefly for honey.  Whereas 
Keatley Moore uses ekphrasis to represent individual pieces of music, however, Curwen 
elevates it to a structural feature of a system in which emotions, hand signs and pitches of the 
scale (Figure 12.3) combine in an imagesoundtext to form the very pedagogical basis of 
Tonic Sol-Fa (learning to read with Do, re, mi, fah, sol, la, ti, do).  Hand signs indicating 
pitch are allocated ‘mental effects’ (emotions) in images representing an emotional spectrum 
from positive to negative, happy to sad, strong to weak.  In some respects Keatley Moore and 
Curwen seem to express what Goehr calls an aesthetic presence, if by aesthetic presence we 
concentrate on the mutual representationality of occasionally unified images, sounds and 
texts.  But Curwen’s more structural ekphrasis is also indicative of an imaginative presence 
in which language is systemically implicated in the representational essence of an 
interdisciplinary musical object.  For Curwen that object is centripetal, unifying, convergent.  
To paraphrase Solis it is an object that has its roots in at least two different objects; or 
McCarty, an object that exists in the interstices of existing objects. 
 
Anderstreben and the interdisciplinary musicological subject 
Curwen’s interdisciplinary musical object may be forged by an ekphrastic (aesthetic or 
imaginative) presence but like ‘The Butterfly’ it also represents the locus of considerable 
(disciplinary) movement.  Whether or not as disciplines all arts aspire to the condition of 
musicology, the Victorian musicological subject is disciplinarily polygamous because the 
musical object represents an experiential fullness sentiently impossible in other disciplines.  
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Walter Pater explains that fact by invoking the word ‘anderstreben’, literally anders-streben – 
other-seeking: ‘what German critics term as Anders-streben – a partial alienation from its 
own limitations, through which the arts are able, not indeed to supply the place of each other, 
but reciprocally to lend each other new forces . . . Thus, again, sculpture aspires out of the 
hard limitation of pure form towards colour, or its equivalent; poetry also, in many ways, 
finding guidance from the other arts, the analogy between a Greek tragedy and a work of 
Greek sculpture, between a sonnet and a relief, of French poetry generally with the art of 
engraving, being more than mere figures of speech; and all the arts in common aspiring 
towards the principle of music; music being the typical, or ideally consummate art, the object 
of the great Anders-streben of all art, of all that is artistic, or partakes of artistic qualities.’68  
The Victorian musicological subject effectively proved anderstreben through a consistently 
self-empowering interdisciplinarity drawn from selective extra-disciplinary methodologies.   
When Herbert Spencer arrived at his theory of musical origins, for example, it represented the 
coalescence of a synthetic philosophy later systemized to include biology, psychology, 
sociology and ethics, amongst other disciplines.  Spencer’s synthetic philosophy revolves 
around principles of evolutionary thought the same way that absolute music revolves around 
sonata form.  Content is mapped onto form.  That Spencer is a methodological absolutist is 
apparent in his positively contrapuntal disciplinary treatment of music.  Music may have 
originated in the ‘physiological deduction’ of impassioned speech (biology); it may be 
effected by ‘mental energy’ (psychology) and manifest ‘a product of civilization’ (sociology); 
and it may indeed be ‘the chief media of sympathy’ (ethics),69 but through the ‘other-seeking’ 
of anderstreben the musicological subject produces a musical object escaping its limitations 
by reciprocally lending itself and other disciplines new forces.  At the same time it is 
indisputable that Spencer’s anderstreben, combined with an ekphrastic predilection, partly 
anticipated and contributed to the creation of musicology as a Victorian interdiscipline –  an 
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interdiscipline that ‘embraces other areas of thought’; an interdiscipline that bridges.70  
Spencer claims rather emphatically that music is a product of civilization, for example, but 
implicitly – if the tenets of musical sympathy are to be believed – that civilization is also a 
product of music.  The point is that Spencer’s intellectual traffic flows both ways across the 
disciplinary bridges. 
In fact the disciplinary bridges flow in more than two ways because Victorian 
disciplines intersect prolifically, and especially with musicology.  Partly, Victorian 
musicology’s ‘other-seeking’ is due to the fact that it in tandem with developments in 
university education (particularly in the science of acoustics) it was also informed by years of 
professionally regulated teaching in conservatoires.  By the time the Musical Association was 
founded in 1874 the Royal Academy of Music was already over fifty years old.  The 
intersection of theory and practice is obviated in Spottiswoode’s repeated proclamation of 
parity between theory and practice.  The society should include ‘persons interested both in 
the theory and practice of Music . . . the foremost Musicians, theoretical as well as practical.’  
The convergence of theory and practice inscribed Victorian musicology with an 
interdisciplinary motivation to cross-purpose the musical object methodologically as a 
genuine site of universal relativity.  Thus, the Victorian musicological subject sought 
disciplinary connections with systemic, not merely aesthetic, implications for the late 
Victorian musical object.  A good example of this is Style in Musical Art (1911) by C. Hubert 
H. Parry, composer, musicologist and ardent Spencerian.  Parry cloaks the classical 
symphony in Spencerian evolutionary language: ‘In such slow steps of development the same 
law of progress is found as elsewhere; simple combinations first, and the more complex 
combinations as, step by step, men mastered the methods upon which they could be dealt 
with.  Progress is always towards the more decisive differentiation, and it is surely is nowhere 
more conspicuously shown than in the story of orchestral music; beginning with a simple 
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group of a few instruments, which were but inadequately used in respect of obtaining from 
each their appropriate ministrations, and then proceeding by constant addition of instruments 
which enhanced the possibilities of expression and colour, and by finding out how to 
amalgamate their idiosyncrasies into a composite and convincing whole.’71  Parry does more 
than synthesize Spencer synthesizing evolution, however; he brings scientific theory into the 
realm of musicological practice, and musicological practice into compositional theory.  As a 
composer himself Parry is both theoretician and practitioner, embodying in music his 
evolutionary compositional theory in practice.  Jeremy Dibble gives us a glimpse of the 
closeness of the relationship in a description of the trio movement of Parry’s Piano Quartet 
(1879) anticipating his later evolutionary sentiments: ‘Parry succeeds in fashioning 
protracted, self-developing thematic paragraphs together with a series of broad, cumulative 
climaxes, and these are further enhanced by the sense of continuity created by the avoidance 
of full closes.’72 
As a musicological subject Parry’s theorist-practitioner is a common feature of an 
interdiscipline ‘unifying’, as McCarty suggests, ‘perspective on what happens at the 
intersection of two or more fields’.  But musicology not only unifies disparate fields in the 
way anderstreben reciprocally lends each discipline new forces, uniquely amongst the arts it 
also can also lend its musical object an ekphrasis converting disciplinary thought (evolution) 
into musical sound (composition).  Ekphrastic anderstreben occurs across a range of 
compositional types inflected by disciplinary predispositions and predilections.  It may seem 
self-evident that as interdisciplinary musical objects Victorian hymns, for example, often 
embody in musical composition the very same characteristics they represent in theology.  In 
current musicology that concept is called Music Theology, and is typified by works that 
interrogate and problematize their disciplinary episteme.73  But the Victorians got there first.  
‘Abide with me’ (text, 1847; music, 1861), for example, is veritably programmatic in the way 
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it portrays the transient nature of life through a series of falling and lengthening melodic 
motifs, but it also recapitulates dogmatic theological principles like the eternal immutability 
of God and the Incarnation of Jesus Christ: in hymns as in the theology they embody ‘Christ 
himself was synonymous with a figuration or metaphor of ‘the Church’.’74  Conversely, 
music can inform theology – even theology reflecting scientific concepts of design: ‘The 
correlations of Music are so many and so perfect,’ John Harrington Edwards suggests, ‘that 
that of themselves they prove a Supreme creative mind.’75 
Edwards not only expresses what many musicologists felt, he does it in a manner 
Victorians would have recognized methodologically; by using music to express theology (and 
theology to express science) the musical object and the musicological subject become 
reciprocally augmented in a way which echoes and magnifies the truth of incarnational 
doctrine.  As this suggests, whether connecting theology, science or other disciplines to 
musicology the Victorian musicologist was acutely aware of the recapitulatory capability a 
critical hermeneutic like anderstreben produces for interdisciplinarity.  Victorian music 
philosopher and evolutionary spokesperson Joseph Goddard exemplifies this awareness in 
The Rise of Music (1908) when as a scientist he claims that ‘the present work is not a history 
of music in the ordinary sense, but rather a tracing of the organic unfolding of the musical art.  
At the same time it presents a perspective of both the history and constitutions of music, in 
which history is seen to elucidate theory, and theory, history.’76  Whether or not it is history 
in the ordinary sense, as anderstreben The Rise of Music typifies Victorian disciplinary 
reciprocality.  If [music] history can elucidate theory and theory [music] history, then 
musicology had come of age, and by definition had become a true interdiscipline existing in 





Pater and Goddard would have probably enjoyed one another’s company, so similar are their 
interdisciplinary approaches.  Using music as a model, both aim to collapse theory and 
practice by breaking down the relationship of matter and form.  Goddard and many other 
Victorian musicologists, like C. Hubert H. Parry, William Wallace and Peter Maurice; 
educationists like John Curwen and Henry Keatley Moore; and theorists like Herbert Spencer 
and Charles Darwin do this by using the same organic properties they observe in musical 
objects to inform their methodologies.77  Pater does this by expressing anderstreben through 
the technique of ekphrasis.  Using those techniques Victorian musicology became an 
interdiscipline by collapsing distinctions between the objects it studied (matter) and the 
structure it was given by subjects studying them (form).  In so doing, Victorian musicology 
went beyond the more limited bridge-building between two disciplines illustrated by the 
classics and theology (chapter 9), autobiography and evolutionary psychology (chapter 8), 
and the novel and the sciences (chapter 11).  
This is not altogether different from what disciplines do today: disciplines seek other 
disciplines to answer questions about themselves, and the result is an interdiscipline which 
bridges disciplines.  But is this result an intrinsic feature of disciplinary behaviour, or is it 
unique to Victorian musicology?  If it is unique why did Victorian musicology 
interdisciplinarize when all other disciplines of the time seem to begin crystallizing into the 
academic disciplines we recognize now?  And if today modern disciplines all gravitate 
ineluctably towards interdisciplinarity is it not unreasonable to describe Victorian musicology 
as the first modern discipline?  Helen Small may provide an answer to these admittedly 
rhetorical questions, if only partially and implicitly: not all disciplines interdisciplinarize in 
the same way, for the same reason or to the same extent.  The humanities, she says, ‘study the 
meaning-making practices of human culture, past and present, focusing on interpretation and 
critical evaluation, primarily in terms of the individual response and with an ineliminable 
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element of subjectivity.’78  Small hits the nail on the head: subjectivity.  The humanities are 
prey to subjectivity in a way unmatched in the sciences because every object they study – 
every work of art they study – is studied specifically for its individuality.  There are, in other 
words, no repeatable ‘experiments’ in the humanities.  Unless technologically replicated 
every object the humanities study (today or historically) is designed to produce a manifestly 
different object.  Even if an experiment in the broadest sense the artistic object is by its nature 
a study in plenitude, and music, according to Pater, the most plenitudenous of all artistic 
objects.  Does music represent an apogee as an art or discipline, therefore?  Certainly Walter 
Pater believed it, because like so many other Victorians he believed in music’s transcendental 
plenitude.79  An interdiscipline is not unlike plenitude, of course; whether contemporary or 
modern the fullest interdiscipline will presumably strive ineluctably for the greatest 
interdisciplinarity.  Sheila Jasanoff suggests this when she defines two types of 
interdiscipline: a new ‘interdiscipline’ as coming into being ‘principally through exchanges 
amongst scholars already belonging to one or another established disciplinary community and 
trained in its forms or reasoning and research practices’; and an ‘interdiscipline’, ‘an 
interdependent disciplinary formation situated among other disciplines.  Such a field may 
come into being through topical exploration and theoretical or methodological innovation as 
well as through exchange, coalescing into an autonomous island of knowledge-making with 
its own native habits of production and trading.’80  Whether or not they are genuinely 
different is a matter of philosophical debate, but one thing is certain, both interdisciplines 
(interdiscipline and interdiscipline) receive inverted commas of subjectivity, and the inverted 
commas are an epistemic give-away.  Like the idea of a specimen type in evolutionary 
thinking, the very concept of an interdiscipline is ontologically unstable, caught between 
theory and practice, matter and form, absolute and relative, unity and diversity, science and 
religion.  The specimen type may be taxonomically fixed, but no natural object subject to the 
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laws of evolution can be said to be truly ‘fixed’ in position.  Like the specimen type, an 
interdiscipline is a conceptual convenience for something we do not fully understand and 
never will, because it exceeds our imagination’s ability to grasp its plenitude.  We can at least 
observe its manifestation and origins in Victorian musicological practice, for example, and 
perhaps this is where future research should concentrate its efforts – identifying where in 
Victorian culture we find it operating; how it functions and why it behaves the way it does.  
Perhaps that will help us bridge to the threshold of the present, where a true interdiscipline 
bridges both time and space, arts and sciences. 
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